The Group of Thirty (est. 1978) is:
It just issued Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability, which "addresses flaws in the global financial system and provides 18 specific recommendations" for additional regulation.
AEI's indispensable Peter Wallison raises an emperor's clothes type question in Regulation without Reason: The Group of Thirty Report:
One should also ask what existing regulatory authorities went unused. For example, Warren Buffet issued his classic characterization of derivatives in 2003:
multiply in variety and number until some event makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous they are has already permeated the electricity and gas businesses, in which the eruption of major troubles caused the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically. Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues to expand unchecked. Central banks and governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts.
Charlie and I believe Berkshire should be a fortress of financial strength – for the sake of our
owners, creditors, policyholders and employees. We try to be alert to any sort of megacatastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly apprehensive about the burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.
So why didn't any of the regulatory agencies pick up this hint and try to introduce some transparency? Come to think of it, where was the Group of 30? Perhaps a little Maoist self-criticism is in order.